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Abstract 
The Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is becoming a more available and popular way of 
communication for the Internet users. This also applies to the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems and 
merging these two have already proven to be successful (e.g. Skype). Even the existing standards 
of VoIP provide an assurance of security and Quality of Service (QoS), however, these features are 
usually optional and supported by a limited number of implementations. As a result, the lack of 
mandatory and widely applicable QoS and security guarantee makes the contemporary VoIP 
systems vulnerable to attacks and network disturbances. In this paper we are facing these issues 
and propose the SecMon system, which simultaneously provides a lightweight security mechanism 
and improves quality parameters of the call. SecMon is intended specially for VoIP service over 
P2P networks and its main advantage is that it provides authentication, data integrity services, 
adaptive QoS and (D)DoS attack detection. Moreover, the SecMon approach represents a low-
bandwidth consumption solution that is transparent to the users and possesses a self-organizing 
capability. The above-mentioned features are accomplished mainly by utilizing two information 
hiding techniques: digital audio watermarking and network steganography. These techniques are 
used to create covert channels that serve as transport channels for lightweight QoS measurement 
results.  Furthermore, these metrics are aggregated in a reputation system that enables best route 
path selection in the P2P network. The reputation system helps also to mitigate (D)DoS attacks, 
maximize performance and increase transmission efficiency in the network. 
 
1. Introduction 
During the recent years, the P2P (Peer-to-Peer) systems have become popular 
in many domains, such as filesharing (e.g. Napster; Gnutella; eDonkey), content 
and software distribution (e.g. BitTorrent), and voice and video communication 
(e.g. Skype, Joost). The latter, in particular, has conquered the communication-
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via-Internet scene and for many end users Skype is the first choice when using 
the computer for calling, rather than VoIP based on classical standards (e.g. SIP 
or H.323). It is expected that P2P systems and related principles will dominate 
future networks, which makes P2P the given choice, for the system proposed in 
this paper: SecMon. 
As opposed to client-server systems, peers (the nodes of a P2P system) are 
acting as client, server and potentially even relay at the same time as they form 
an overlay network. Structured P2P systems distinguish between different types 
of peers in order to avoid scalability problems. An important feature of P2P 
systems is self-organisation, which amongst others, implies that a peer can enter 
or leave the network at any time without jeopardising the overall functionality.  
For real-time services like VoIP, security and performance are in general 
antagonists: security mechanisms impose overheads affecting performance, 
which may make users switch off security measures in order to get better 
performance [1]. On the other hand, performance monitoring can enable the 
detection of a security attack, e.g., modification and data tampering by increase 
of a transmission delay or jitter. In this paper, security mechanisms are used to 
help with performance and security monitoring.   
As mentioned earlier the proposed SecMon system is intended for VoIP 
service deployed in P2P networks. It is characterized by providing security 
services such as authentication and data integrity based on a lightweight 
mechanism. Moreover, it enables adaptive QoS and (D)DoS attacks detection. It 
is also a low bandwidth consumption solution, and what is very important is that 
it is transparent to users while possessing self-organizing capability. These 
features are achieved by utilizing two information hiding techniques, namely 
digital audio watermarking and network steganography. These techniques are 
used to create covert channels that serve as transport channels for lightweight 
QoS measurement results.   
As mentioned above, this paper considers VoIP service in P2P overlay 
networks and in this environment the trust management will be used for 
misbehaviour detection and nodes evaluation. Such evaluation allows creating a 
long-term node assessment called a reputation. It is a mean that will be used for 
providing incentives for a good behaviour of nodes and metric, which allows for 
choosing a more truthful node. In SecMon we also utilize a reputation 
maintaining system in order to detect any untrustworthy behaviour in the 
network that interferes with QoS for a VoIP media transmission. As a result, in 
SecMon originators of such activities are isolated. The goal of the reputation 
management is to motivate nodes to be well cooperative, which would improve 
the network security and performance. In the proposed system the reputation 
model will be used to improve routing path selection for media transmission as 
well as for efficient sending of QoS monitoring and security information. 
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The earlier project AutoMon that has been sponsored by the European 
Network of Excellence Euro-NGI developed a P2P-based monitoring 
infrastructure [2], exploiting self-organisation and implementing autonomic 
networking facilities with focus on generating quality feedback on behalf of the 
users. Also the earlier authors’ research has advocated end-to-end quality 
monitoring based on passive measurements, e.g. of application-perceived 
throughput [2,3,4,5,6]. This monitoring principle requires a continuous exchange 
of the monitoring results. On the other hand, the use of the suitable summary 
statistics of packets transmission such as average and standard deviation makes 
the related monitoring overhead lightweight, especially when it can be piggy-
backed onto existing data transfers. The proposed approach enables this in a new 
way. As pointed out before, the lightweight monitoring targeted by this paper 
matches well the limited capacity of the covert channels. Moreover, the less 
capacity needed for performance management, the more is left for providing 
security: the better the chance for both to coexist. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we circumscribe the SecMon 
architecture, node model and a general communication flow between functional 
blocks. Sections from 3 to 7 describe each defined functional block operation in 
detail. Finally, Section 8 concludes our work. 
 
2. SecMon architecture 
In every Peer-to-Peer network one may distinguish two layers: the Service 
Layer which covers functionality of data routing, network discovery, self-
organizing logic and a particular service itself, such as VoIP; and the Transport 
Layer as an inherent part of an underlying network, providing data 
transportation service. SecMon system introduces an intermediate layer which 
interacts with the Service and Transport layers, as shown in Fig. 1. The detailed 
description of Transport and Service layer focuses only on interfaces towards the 
SecMon system.  
 
Fig. 1. P2P overlay network composition for SecMon 
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2.1. Node model 
Apart from the Data Plane which directly refers to data transmission, all P2P 
network functionality is organized inside the Control Plane. The SecMon system 
aims at improving and extending the Control Plane of P2P networks with 
lightweight security and QoS features. 
The P2P network is composed of a certain number of nodes and constitutes a 
three-layer network model, which is directly reflected in the functional 
construction of every SecMon node. The node model is depicted in Fig. 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2. SecMon Layer in a Control Plane of P2P network stack 
 
The SecMon system performs several different operations based on the 
interaction with outer layers. Inside such a system one may identify internal 
functions which are specific and organized within the following functional 
blocks: 
– Covert Channels Block (CCB) – two sub-channels are used to exchange 
QoS and Security Measurement data between nodes along the 
communication path. It is used by SMB and QMB; 
– Security Management Block (SMB) – is in charge of evaluation of 
lightweight security measurement data, perform data securing with 
steganography and watermarking. It delivers metrics to RMB and IDS; 
– QoS management Block (QMB) – is in charge of measurements and 
evaluation of lightweight QoS metrics. It delivers metrics to RMB and 
IDS; 
– Intrusion Detection System Block (IDS) – anomaly detection system, is 
obliged to rise alerts in a case of attack detection and report it to RMB;  
– Reputation Management Block (RMB) – collects and aggregates metrics 
coming from QMB, SMB, and IDS in order to support a best path-path 
selection in a P2P routing process.  
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The SecMon system interactions are realized by means of internal and 
external interfaces, which have been enumerated in Fig. 3. For an already 
established VoIP session, the SecMon system operations are described by the 
following messages: 
 
 
Fig. 3. Message flow between SecMon functional blocks 
 
1. Sending/Receiving hidden lightweight QoS and Security measurement 
throughout data transportation, taking advantage of covert channels and 
regaining the same bandwidth occupation. 
2. Writing lightweight Security measurement data into covert channels. 
3. Reading lightweight Security measurement data from covert channels. 
4. Writing lightweight QoS measurement data into covert channels. 
5. Reading lightweight QoS measurement data from covert channels. 
6. Reading measurements parameters (e.g. packet losses, jitter, and 
throughput) for network performance. 
7. Delivering Security metrics to RMB.  
8. Delivering Security metrics to IDS. 
9. Delivering QoS metrics to IDS. 
10. Delivering QoS metrics to RMB.  
11. Alerting about (D)DoS attacks to the RMB. 
12. Request for the best next hop selection from P2P service layer to RMB 
13. Indication answer for the best next hop selection in RMB. 
14. Reputation sharing between nodes, with the additional communication 
protocol. 
Every SecMon block performs a set of specific operations which are 
described in detail with the following subsections. 
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3. QoS management block: lightweight monitoring  
and related time constants 
The task of lightweight monitoring consists in discovering performance 
problems in an efficient way, which means that a rather small amount of 
monitoring data should be sent and processed in order to derive indications on 
performance problems. Still, the complete data stream of interest should be 
observed at different points in the network. These requirements actually exclude 
active measurements that may impose a significant extra load on links and nodes 
while merely delivering performance snapshots [5]. Moreover, the proposed 
method needs to be robust with regard to clock synchronization problems. 
In [6] a method for comparative throughput measurements has been proposed, 
building upon packet or byte counts on short time scales, i.e. for small averaging 
intervals of length ∆T. From comparisons of the sender’s and receiver’s 
throughput histograms, the existence and severity of a bottleneck is seen. 
Experience has shown that a useful averaging interval should capture at least 
five to ten packets, while an observation interval ∆W should capture at least ten 
averaging intervals. The observation interval can be moved in a jumping or 
moving window fashion. The method was, amongst others, used for describing 
the throughput performance of mobile links [3,5], and it became obvious that 
changes of average and standard deviation of the throughput averaged over ∆T 
and observed during ∆W between the sender and the receiver clearly describe the 
impact of the bottleneck. This impact can be formulated in utility functions [7], 
which correlate well with voice Quality of Experience through comparably 
simple formulae [8,9]. The statistical calculations can be implemented in a very 
efficient way using a ring-buffer mechanism [10]. 
The class of service supported by the SecMon architecture is particularly 
user-oriented, which makes it necessary to take user-imposed constraints into 
account. According to a usability analysis [11], glitches of more than 100 ms 
might be perceived as delays. An average user may lose concentration on  
a stalling process after about one second. After four seconds, things are getting 
boring for the user [12]. Users are in general not willing to wait more than ten 
seconds; otherwise, the risk of abandoning the process is large [11,12]. The 
challenge for the SecMon architecture consists in ensuring a reasonably good 
user perception, which means:  
– The discovery of performance and security problems preferably within the 
user reaction time of one second, 
– The resolution of such problems within a couple of seconds before the user 
starts thinking about abandoning the process, e.g. by signalling towards the 
source so that it can adapt itself to the new conditions, or by finding 
another route, which we focus on in the sequel. 
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The combination of its properties and the requirements listed above make the 
proposed lightweight monitoring method a promising candidate for performance 
evaluation within SecMon. Its light weight is seen from the following example: 
Assume (a) ∆T = 500 ms, allowing for the discovery of performance problems 
on at least that time scale; (b) a sliding window, which means that each ∆T, 
monitoring data is sent from the sender to the receiver in order to be compared. 
Assuming a coding of 1 B per piece of data (for instance, average and standard 
deviation of the packet rate during ∆W); we arrive at a data rate of merely 32 
bps. 
 
4. Covert channels block: information hiding techniques 
Information hiding has two sub-disciplines and they are: steganography and 
digital watermarking. The general difference between these two techniques is 
that the aim of steganography is to keep the existence of the information secret 
and in watermarking making it imperceptible. 
Steganography is a process of hiding secret data inside other, normally 
transmitted data, so in an ideal situation, anyone scanning data will fail to know 
it contains covert data. In modern digital steganography, the hidden data is 
inserted into redundant (provided but often unneeded) data, e.g. fields in 
communication protocols, graphic image, etc. For TCP/IP steganography (or 
network stenography) the most important fact is that a few fields in the packet’s 
headers are changed during transit. 
For digital watermarking the most important application for this project is the 
ability of embedding the authentication and integrity watermark. We can embed 
data that is similar to a cryptographic hash, into voice samples. This hash will be 
invisible and inseparable from the data. 
 
4.1. Motivation: secure and lightweight transfer of quality/security monitoring data 
By using the abovementioned information hiding techniques we will be able 
to create two covert sub-channels. In this way we may achieve a solution that 
does not consume transmission bandwidths because the control bits (that allow 
distinguishing what data is transferred) are transmitted in a covert (stegano-
graphic) channel and data (quality/security monitoring data) is inseparably 
bound to voice content in a form of digital watermark. Such a usage of covert 
sub-channels gives opportunity to exchange different types of data (e.g., 
monitoring information) but it also provides security verification of the 
transmission source and the content sent (authentication and integrity). Using 
these covert channels in the presented way is described in detail in [13] and [14] 
and will be applied accordingly. 
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4.2. Network steganography and its application 
In SecMon for VoIP service we will exploit unused/optional fields in the 
IP/UDP/RTP packets because these protocols are used in all IP telephony 
implementations. Covert data is usually inserted into redundant fields (provided, 
but often unneeded) for the abovementioned protocols and then transferred to the 
receiving side. As described in [15] and [16], the IP header alone possesses  
a few fields that are available to be used as a covert channel, and we can also 
deploy unused UDP and RTP protocol fields. The total capacity of those fields 
exceeds 32 bits per packet. 
Furthermore, we can distribute the control bits among these fields in  
a predetermined fashion (this pattern can be exchanged during a signalling phase 
of conversation). In the chosen fields we will only transmit the header (control 
bits) of our protocol with the use of steganography technique. Because the 
header consists of only a few bits per packet, such a type of transmission is 
potentially hard to discover.  
 
4.3. Audio watermarking  
The primary application of audio watermarking was to preserve copyright 
and/or intellectual property protection, sometimes called DRM (Digital Right 
Management). However, this technique can be also used to create effectively  
a covert channel inside a digital content. Generally, the audio watermarking 
algorithm consists of two phases: embedding the digital watermark into the 
voice at the source, and then its extraction at the destination place. In IP 
telephony we can distinguish those phases too; as soon as the conversation 
begins, certain information is embedded into the voice samples and sent through 
the communication channel. Then, the digital watermark is extracted from  
a voice stream before it reaches a caller.  
Currently, there are a number of audio watermarking algorithms available. 
The most popular methods that can be utilized in real-time communication for 
VoIP service include: LSB (Least Significant Bit), QIM (Quantization Index 
Modulation), Echo Hiding, DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum), and 
FHSS (Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum). For these algorithms the 
bandwidth of available covert channels depends mainly on the sampling rate and 
the type of audio material being encoded. In [17], research results have shown 
that for LSB the communication rate is 1 kbps per 1 kHz (e.g. for 8 kHz 
sampling rate the capacity is 8 kbps), echo hiding around 16 bps, while DSSS 
achieved 4 bps. Also experiments in [17] have shown that the DSSS method’s 
bandwidth is about 22.5 bps, FHSS 20.2 bps, echo hiding 22.3 bps and LSB 
around 4 kbps. Based on those results one can clearly see that, besides LSB 
watermarking (which is easy to detect and erase and that is why will not be 
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considered here), the other methods achieved a covert channel bandwidth range 
from a few to tens of bits per second. 
Moreover, most audio watermarking algorithms for the real-time 
communication are designed to survive the typical non-malicious operations 
like: low bit rate audio compression, codec changes, DA/AD conversion, or 
packet loss. For example, in [18], the watermarking scheme developed at the 
Fraunhofer IPSI (Institut Integrierte Publikations und Informationssysteme) was 
tested for different compression methods. The results revealed that large 
simultaneous capacity and robustness depend on the scale of the codec 
compression. When the compression rate is high (1:53), the digital watermark is 
robust only when we embed about 1 bps. With a lower compression rate we can 
obtain about 30 bps, whereas the highest data rate was 48 bps with good, robust 
transparent and complexity parameters. 
 
5. Security management block 
In this functional block of the SecMon system, the lightweight security 
mechanism will operate. This security mechanism will be implemented 
analogously as defined in [13]. The main concept is based on a shared secret 
scheme – certain tokens (in form of hashes) are calculated locally and then sent 
to the other communication side, where they are verified. In this way, we gain 
source authentication and data integrity. Moreover, we can also include 
signalling messages security as a post-factum verification method as defined in 
[13]. Additionally, QoS monitoring data will also be secured, as defined in [14]. 
 
6. Reputation management block 
The reputation term is defined as a perceived grade of trustworthiness to  
a particular peer created by its historical behaviour during observations and 
interactions with third party peers in the given context and time. This definition 
describes a concept of peer’s reputation expressed by a level of aggregated trust 
exchanged and shared between other peers. Reputation tends to represent 
generalized opinions in a local group of peers. As the reputation may comprise 
an aggregated trust of several network nodes, it becomes a very valuable metric 
supporting the P2P routing process [19]. In particular, the trust has a context, 
which refers to a specific environment. For SecMon we use the Reputation 
Management Block to create a trust to the peering nodes, which may influence 
the network reliability, expressed by QoS parameters and the Security level.  
Presented in Fig. 4, Reputation Management Block is used in SecMon for 
end-to-end routing support in the P2P overlay network. Thanks to the ability of 
keeping historical knowledge, the reputations system is eligible to mitigate 
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(D)DoS attacks, maximize performance and increase transmission efficiency in 
the network.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Reputation Management Block for SecMon 
 
In SecMon the reputation block operates on sets of information, which are 
conveyed inside the covert channels. The first is related to QoS metrics of the 
lightweight monitoring approach and the second refers to security metrics. Based 
on these the IDS block feeds the RMB with (D)DoS attack reports. Those 
parameters are monitored by far-end and all intermediate nodes along the 
communication path, and are used to build an Evidence Repository. Reports are 
a source of data for Context Reputation Evaluation where Performance and 
Security Service Reputations are calculated.  
The Performance Service Reputation (PSR) for QoS expresses reliability in 
the network and is related to the typical quality threats for voice: 
– Lost voice samples and packets may imply cracks in and drop-outs of the 
voice if no interpolation is effective. Drop-outs longer than one second 
might entail user reaction. The impact of loss can be seen from changes of 
the average throughput during ∆W between the sender and the receiver (or 
two arbitrary nodes along the path). 
– Delayed voice samples that do not exceed the jitter buffer are uncritical; 
otherwise, the result is similar to loss. The impact of jitter can be seen from 
changes of the standard deviation of the throughput with the averaging and 
the observation intervals ∆T and ∆W, respectively. 
– Too large jitter buffers destroy the feeling of interactivity, but provide the 
management with some more time to (re-)act before the user actually feels 
the problems. 
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The Security Service Reputation (SSR) represents the level of trust for the 
communicating P2P nodes. Security considerations in the SecMon system are 
based on the information hiding paradigm. Digital watermarking delivers data 
integrity and end-to-end authentication. The integrity monitoring and 
verification may be performed by every node being along the path. This feature 
allows detecting any malicious activity in the network such as: 
– Man-in-the-middle attacks: packet payload modifications, packet 
retransmission, reply attack, packets reordering, (D)DoS attack.  
– Appearing of packet chains in the network, which are not related to the 
existing sessions, indicating that unauthorized packets in the network 
consume network resources. 
The SSR reflects an opinion on positive and malicious nodes activity. Based 
on the knowledge coming from evidence repository, the SSR metric is evaluated 
in order to take preventing actions.  
The Reputation-based Route Recommendation function is in charge of 
indicating the best next hop peer along the path regarding the SSR and PSR 
values. It interacts with the routing process in the P2P Service Layer supporting 
VoIP service reliability. Reputation Management Block supports decisions for 
P2P network resulting in an efficient and best path selection, path re-establishing 
by selecting alternative routes, misbehaving nodes isolation and service 
reputation sharing. The reputation may be shared in the local neighbourhood 
reinforcing the efficient and secure routing. 
The reputation service changes in time reacting with possible actions for any 
detected network issues. In the case of alarms triggered by QoS degradation or  
a security attack, it is reflected by undertaken actions (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Service reputation metrics with a characteristic peer’s behaviour  
and short term reputation system reaction  
PSR – QoS 
acceptable 
SSR – positive 
hash verification Conclusion 
Short term reputation 
system reaction 
Yes Yes Good reputation Monitoring 
Yes No Security attack Re-establish a new session, isolate affecting nodes  
No Yes Jitter problem 
Share reputation with other 
nodes in order to omit 
nodes and balance network 
overloaded nodes  
No No 
Data losses, 
network link 
failure, (D)DoS 
attack 
Re-establish a new session 
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6.1. Service reputation evaluation 
For SecMon, the reputation evaluation method follows Liu’s [20] approach. 
Based on its adaptation to the peer-to-peer environment [19], the reputation 
system takes advantage of Own Experience OE and second-hand information, 
which comes from the adjoining peers. The reputation evaluation considers past 
experience and recommendation reputation of voters (recommends). We define 
two types of second-hand information, related to the immediate nodes and 
cumulative reputation describing aggregated reputation of the closest nodes’ 
neighbourhood. The second-hand messages are exchanged on demand of the 
interested nodes. In order to detect malicious behaviour and any anomalies in the 
information, second-hand recommendations are validated by a statistical 
correlation approach. 
In SecMon we define security and performance reputation, SSR and PSR 
respectively. However, though they reflect two different kinds of activity in the 
network, the evaluation method is the same for both metrics and corresponds to 
the Service Reputation SR. 
Service Reputation evolves in time n and for exemplary Fig. 5 is determined 
by the following equations: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) (1 )
( )
B Bp
n np GVBB B
n n B
np GVB
IR p V A
SR A OE A
IR p
α α ∈
∈
= + − ∑ ∑ , 
 ( ) 0, 0 1,SnIR p GVB peers of Bα> < < ≡ . 
The Information Reputation IR represents credibility of a node recommen-
ding other peers. Recommendations V come from immediate nodes in the 
network and reflect the service reputation on other adjacent nodes. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Reputation path building  
 
In order to create the Reputation Path RP, which goes throughout nodes B 
and A, a Cumulative Path CP is first calculated: 
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7. IDS (Intrusion Detection System) block: attack detection module 
Within the SecMon architecture the detection module (IDS) receives input 
from the QoS and Security Management systems. There are two basic 
approaches for the attack detection: 
– Signature-based detection: these techniques assume the existence of  
a database with all attack definitions (i.e. signatures). The detection 
mechanism monitors the communications running in the network and 
compares them against the entries of the signature database. These 
techniques are efficient when signature definitions are simple. They 
usually include packet attributes which can be easily checked. The major 
drawbacks of these techniques are: the high rate of the false positive 
alarms, impossibility to detect flooding attacks based on packets similar to 
the legitimate ones;  
– Anomaly-based detection: these techniques assume that in the real world, 
the malicious attack behaviours progress over the time, which makes the 
attacks impossible to be foreseen, and consequently detected using the 
signature techniques. In this regard, these techniques try to build  
a reference model of the legitimate traffic and raise the alarm anytime the 
monitored traffic violates this model. Thus, they take the opposite 
approach to the signature techniques. If the model tightly defines the 
legitimate traffic, it can yield an increased number of false positive alarms. 
On the other hand, if the model loosely defines the legitimate traffic, it can 
yield an increased number of false negative alarms. Therefore, one 
challenge of these techniques is to find out the right set of traffic 
characterization parameters, in order to trade-off between those two types 
of false alarms. Another challenge is to keep the legitimate traffic model 
updated with the daily emerging applications.  The main advantage of 
these techniques is the capacity to detect the newest attacks, even when 
they are unknown. 
The main types of models used for anomaly detection are the following: 
– Behaviour-based model: which relies on a selected set of traffic 
parameters whose domain of values is learned through monitoring the 
attack-free traffic on the network over a predefined period. If one of the 
parameters’ values overcomes a predefined threshold value, the detection 
system raises an alarm. The sensitivity and accuracy of these models 
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depend on: the quality of the chosen set of traffic parameters, the threshold 
values, and the granularity of the learning period (e.g. daily, weekly).  
– Standard-based model: uses the standard specification of communication 
protocols and the traffic specifications to build an abstract model of the 
valid traffic. This model can guarantee no false positive alarms, and 
necessitate a low rate for the model update. It only prevents attacks that 
violate the standards for communication. The main drawback is the high 
granularity of monitoring, which needs to be done at the connection level. 
Consequently, this model requires more resources for processing and 
storage, for a given level of performance.  
– Misbehaviour detection: this category meets the characteristics from both 
categories presented above. These techniques model the malicious 
behaviour, rather than the good one and operate a detection procedure 
analogous to that for the signature based detection. The main challenge of 
this category is to find out the proper malicious traffic characteristics 
which can assure the attack detection from its first stages. 
Once an attack has been detected, the SecMon detection module should run 
the attack characterization task before the reputation system is notified. Attack 
characterization aims at the definition of the attack’s context (w.r.t. offending 
traffic and the agents of attack). This task yields the input for the SecMon 
response mechanisms: the reputation system. Therefore, the quality of the attack 
characterization outcome can influence the performance of the response 
mechanisms (e.g. collateral losses). 
The main properties of the underlying detection system are the accuracy and 
the timeliness. The accuracy is the property of the system to correctly detect the 
attacks. The accuracy is measured in a number of detection errors achieved by  
a detection system within a given period. The two categories of detection errors, 
which we will also take into consideration further on, are false positive and false 
negative errors.   
The timeliness is the property of a detection system to promptly detect the 
attacks. Since the majority of attacks require some time in order to succeed,  
a detection window has been defined, within which the detection mechanisms 
will work for the early alarm notification. Obviously, the detection window size 
depends on the type of attack. As soon as the attacks are detected within the 
detection window, the countermeasures taken by the response system are more 
effective. When an attack is detected early, the response system can make the 
attack transparent to the end users, and even avoid the protected network service 
disruption. Even when the attack is detected late, its negative effects can be 
reduced and limited.  
The overall performance of the detection system depends on its localization. 
Generally speaking, the accuracy of detection depreciates proportionally with 
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the distance to the protected network service/resource. This is due to the fact that 
the detection system can only have a complete view of the traffic of the attack 
close to the protected resource.  
Moreover, when detection mechanisms are applied in the network core, they 
should be less complex, in order to fit the limited resources there. Consequently, 
the accuracy of detection could be even more diminished. On the other hand, 
when applied close to the potential source of the attack, the detection 
mechanisms could be quite complex, because the amount of traffic seen at the 
source of an attack is moderately low, even during the attack. 
While placing the detection mechanisms close to the potential target seems to 
be a better solution, the response mechanisms are more effective and incur 
limited collateral effects when acting close to the source of the attack. However, 
applying the response mechanisms in the core of the network allows a good 
trade-off between the costs of the response mechanisms deployment on the high 
scale and the collateral effects it can produce. 
Unfortunately, securing a distributed reactive system proved to be a more 
complex process and more difficult to achieve, than for an autonomous one  
(a reactive system whose both mechanisms for detection and response are 
collocated). 
 
Conclusions and future work 
In this paper a lightweight approach for monitoring and managing of QoS and 
security (SecMon) is introduced and discussed. It is also intended to be used for 
reputation-based routing in the VoIP P2P overlay networks. SecMon implements 
an additional layer between the P2P overlay and the (IP-based) transport layer. 
Moreover, functional blocks of SecMon have been described, which comprise 
QoS management, security management, IDS, reputation management and 
covert channels for exchanging management data with other SecMon-enabled 
peers. It was shown that the latter implements a lightweight solution for QoS 
management in the sense that no extra capacity needs to be allocated to the 
monitoring as long as the corresponding data rate remains below some tens of 
bps, which seems to be feasible. The security management will apply tokens in 
the form of hashes, and the IDS will mitigate (D)DoS attacks of the type flood 
by the anomaly-based detection built on a behaviour-based model. The core 
functionality supporting the routing process on the P2P or the service layer is the 
reputation system, taking into account inputs from the QoS and the security 
management as well as from the IDS. As the SecMon system offers possibilities 
to apply attack detection mechanisms (in the form of the reputation-based 
routing) right in the core of the network, its specific IDS system will allow  
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a good trade-off between the costs of the response mechanisms deployment on 
the high scale and the collateral effects it can produce. 
So far, this paper has introduced a concept of the system which needs to be 
parameterised, implemented and validated, initially by simulations. For instance, 
critical timescales in the system need to be linked to the monitoring facilities, 
while the reputation management block will need to take both long-term, ”static” 
and short-term, ”dynamic” [10] performance results into account. The output of 
the reputation management has to be delivered according to the timescale 
imposed by the goal for the discovery of performance problems, around one 
second. Finally, the QoS and security blocks need to act on the level of seconds 
as described above in order to assure satisfactory end user performance. In this 
context, the underlying model for the discovery of QoS and IDS problems needs 
to be specified; one candidate for this is a statistical change point detection 
algorithm. In the medium term, implementation involving real users and 
applications is target in order to demonstrate the viability of the SecMon 
approach. 
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